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Abstract
The primary purpose of this paper is to examine the behavioral
implications and empirical testability of the game-theoretic models
of bargaining which follow in the tradition begun by Nash (1950)
.
The classical game-theoretic models are reviewed with particular at-
tention to the assumptions which they make concerning the kinds of
information shared by the bargainers. The experimental literature
concerned with testing these models is also reviewed, with, particular
attention to the extent to which these experiments have conformed to
the assumptions of the models they are designed to test. Seme of the
principal differences between the theoretical predictions and the re-
sults reported in these experiments seem to be due to questions con-
cerning the information shared by the bargainers. A new game-theoretic
model is presented, based on assumptions about information which more
closely correspond to the conditions under which many of these experi-
ments have been conducted. A new experiment which manipulates the ap-
propriate kind of information was conducted. The results support the
hypothesis that Nash's bargaining model has predictive value in situa-
tions which conform to its assumptions about information, but they also
suggest that only a relatively narrow range of situations may conform
completely to these assumptions. The results also support the hypothe-
sis that the new model has predictive value in situations which conform
to its assumptions.
Bargaining is a pervasive and important social phenomenon which
has been studied from a multitude of perspectives by investigators
from a variety of disciplines. The primary purpose of this paper is
to examine the behavioral implications and empirical testability of
the game-theoretic models of bargaining which follow in the tradition
begun by Nash (1950) , and which provide the theoretical basis for much
of the work on bargaining done by economists. These models are inti-
mately associated with expected utility theory, and they present for-
midable obstacles to laboratory experimentation. Largely for this
reason, these models have not entered into the mainstream of bargain-
ing research conducted by social psychologists. For instance, this
family of models is not mentioned at all in the encyclopedic survey
of experimental bargaining research by Rubin and Brown (1975) , while
Chertkoff and Esser (1976) state that
"Although these models may have been ignored to a
certain extent because many social psychologists are
not mathematically inclined, there are undoubtedly
other reasons. First, the theories contain constructs,
like utility, that are difficult to measure. Second,
the models usually deal with broad concepts, like the
utility of payoffs, without specifying in any detail
what variables are related to them, and in what way."
Morley and Stephenson (1977) go one step further, and state that
"...these theories not only have not been subject to empirical tests
but also do not have any obvious behavioral implications."
This paper begins with a review of the classical game- theoretic
models of Nash and Raiffa, with particular attention to the mathematical
condition which specifies the kind of information which the models as-
sume can potentially influence the outcome of bargaining. Included in
this review will be recent mathematical results which emphasize the extent
to which the predictions of the models are dependent on this information
condition.
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The experiments which have been conducted to test these models
will then be reviewed, with particular attention to the degree to which
the conditions of the models have been successfully implemented and to
the kinds of information which the various implementations make avail-
able to the bargainers. While the game-theoretic models are defined
in terms of the expected utility of the bargainers, the experiments
designed to test these models have mostly equated utility payoffs
with monetary payoffs. We will argue that bargaining situations in
which the players have common knowledge of one another's monetary
payoffs make available a different quality of jointly-shared infor-
mation than situations in which the players have common knowledge of
one another's utility payoffs. This is because the players' utility
payoffs are uniquely defined only up to independently normalized
interval scales, while monetary payoffs are defined on a common ab-
solute scale.
Situations in which the players know one another's monetary pay-
offs permit them to make comparisons which they otherwise could not make.
A new mathematical result will be presented, characterizing a model of
bargaining which differs from the classical models in its assumptions
about information. This new model reflects the comparisons which can
influence the outcome of bargaining when players know one another's mone-
tary payoffs.
A new experiment will then be reported, which is designed to
investigate the effect of this difference in the quality of the shared
information. This experiment permits both the expected utility avail-
able to the players and the information which they share as common
knowledge to be controlled and manipulated. The (preliminary) results
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suggest that Nash's classical game- theoretic model is a good predictor
of behavior in bargaining situations which make available precisely the
right kind of information to the bargainers. These results also suggest,
however, that relatively few bargaining situations provide precisely
this information, and that the classical models require modification
in situations which make available either too little or too much of
various kinds of information.
The final section summarizes the conclusions reached in this paper,
and considers directions for future research in which the interaction
between theory and experiment seems likely to bear fruit.
The Classical Game-Theoretic Models
Before entering into a discussion of the bargaining models, we will
very briefly consider the elements of expected utility theory on which
these models depend. (The new experimental design presented later will
also depend critically on the elements of utility theory reviewed here.)
Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) were the first to demonstrate con-
ditions on an individual's preferences which are sufficient so that
his choice behavior over risky events is the same as if he were maxi-
mizing the expected value of a real valued function called his utility
2function . Given sufficient information about an individual's pre-
ferences, his utility function can be constructed, although this fun-
ction is uniquely defined only up to an interval scale.
For simplicity, consider the case where the set of alternatives A
contains elements a and c such that, for any alternative b in the set A,
the individual in question likes the alternative a at least as well as
b and b at least as well as c. Then if u is a utility function represent-
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ing this individual's preferences over the set of alternatives A, it must
have the property that u(a)
_> u(b) _> u(c). Since u is defined only up to
an interval scale, we may arbitrarily choose its unit and zero point, and
in particular we may take u(a) = 1 and u(c) = 0. The problem of deter-
mining u(b) then becomes the problem of finding the appropriate value
between and 1 so that all those lotteries over alternatives which the
individual prefers to b have a higher expected utility, and all those
lotteries to which b is preferred have a lower expected utility. If we
denote by L(p) = [pa;(l-p)c] the lottery which with probability p yields
the alternative a and with probability (1-p) yields the alternative c,
then the utility of participating in the lottery L(p) is its expected
utility, pu(a) + (l-p)u(c) = p. If p is the probability such that the
individual is indifferent between b and L(p), then their utilities must
be equal, and so u(b) = p. Thus when we say that the utility of
alternative b to a given individual is known, we mean that the proba-
bility p is known such that he is indifferent between having the al-
ternative b for certain, or having the risky alternative L(p), which
yields alternative a with probability p and c with probability (1-p).
For instance consider an individual who is faced with a choice
of receiving half a million dollars for certain, or participating
in a lottery which will give him a million dollars with probability
p and otherwise give him zero dollars. Then if we set his utility
function for zero dollars at 0, and his utility for a million dol-
lars at 1, determining his utility for half a million dollars means
determining the probability p which would leave him indifferent be-
tween the lottery or the half million dollars. Most of us would
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require p to be considerably greater than 1/2 before we would take
the lottery over the sure half million, which is to say that our
utility function is not linear in money, and that our utility for
half a million dollars is more than half way between our utility for
zero dollars and our utility for a million dollars. In what follows,
when we say that one individual knows another's utility for a given
event (e.g. a particular reward), we are not requiring that he know
any utility theory
,
but rather that he has sufficient knowledge of
the other's preferences to be able to determine an equivalent lot-
tery of the sort just described. (For a more complete discussion,
see von Neumann & Morgenstern (1953), Herstein and Milnor (1953),
or Krantz, Luce, Suppes and Tversky (1971).)
Following Nash (1950) we can now define a pure bargaining game be-
tween two players to be a situation in which there is a set of feasible
outcomes, any one of which will be the final outcome of the game if it
is agreed to by both players. In the event that they fail to reach
agreement, some fixed disagreement outcome becomes the final outcome of
the game. That is, the rules of the game give each player a veto over
any outcome other than the disagreement outcome. The players are assumed
to be fully informed both about the rules of the game and about the
set of feasible outcomes.
Nash modelled such a game by a pair (S,d), where S is a subset
of the plane which contains d. He further required that the set S be
compact and convex, and that it contain at least one point x such that
x > d (i.e., tl. > d
1
and x_ > d
? ).
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The interpretation which he gave is that the set S is the set of
feasible expected utility payoffs available to the players (i.e., if the
players agree on a point x = (x.. ,x_) in S, then players 1 and 2 receive
a utility of x.. and x„ respectively), while d = (d.. ,d„) denotes the
utility payoffs to the players in the event of disagreement. Thus,
under Nash's interpretation, the assumption that the players know
the set of outcomes means that they know one another's utilities for
3
each potential agreement. The condition that S is convex is thus
appropriate if, for instance, any lottery between feasible agreements
4is also a feasible agreement. The condition that S is compact is
justified if, for instance, the set of feasible outcomes consists
of a finite number of distinct alternatives and the lotteries between
them, while the requirement that S contains at least one point x such
that x > d insures that both players prefer some feasible agreement
to the consequences of failing to reach agreement. That is, this
latter requirement confines our attention to games in which both play-
ers can gain from reaching an agreement.
Having thus modelled the bargaining situations to which his theory
is addressed, Nash modelled the bargaining process by a function (called
a solution) which selects a feasible outcome for every bargaining game.
2
That is, letting B denote the class of bargaining games (and R denote the
2plane), then a solution is a function f:B * R such that for every game
(S,d), f(S,d) is an element of S. (Thus a solution models a bargaining
process by specifying its outcome.) Nash proposed that a solution should
possess the following properties.
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Property 1. Pareto optimality : If f(S,d) = z, then the set
S contains no element x distinct from z such that x
_> z.
The first property specifies that the bargaining process will not yield
any outcome which both players find less desirable than some other feasi-
ble outcome.
Property 2. Symmetry: If f(S,d) = z and if (S,d) is a sym-
metric game (i.e., if d.. = d„ and if for every (x.. ,x_) in S,
(x
9
,x..) is also contained in S) , then z
1
= z_.
The second property specifies that if the game (S,d) makes no distinction
between the players, then neither should the solution.
Property 3. Independence of irrelevant alternatives: If
(S,d) and (T,d) are bargaining games such that S contains
T, and if f(S,d) is an element of T, then f(T,d) = f(S,d).
The third property can perhaps best be understood to specify that the
bargaining process in question yields, in some sense, the "best" out-
come of z in the feasible set S, and that the best outcome in S would
also be the best outcome in any smaller set T.
The fourth property relates to the fact that the game (S,d) is
interpreted as being defined in terms of the expected utility functions
of the players, which are themselves defined only up to an interval scale,
i.e., only up to an arbitrary choice of origin and unit. It states that
if a game (S',d') is derived from (S,d) by transforming the utility func-
tions of the players to equivalent representations of their preferences,
then the same transformations applied to the outcome of the game (S,d)
should yield the outcome selected in (S',d'). That is, it states that the
solution should depend only on the preferences of the players, and not
on any arbitrary features of the utility functions which represent these
preferences.
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Property 4. Independence of equivalent utility representa-
tions: If f(S,d) = z, and (S',d') is a bargaining game related
to (S,d) by the transformations d' = (a..d.. + b
, a„d„ + b ? ),
S' = {(a..x, + b,
,
a„x
2
+b
2
j(x-,x
2 ) e
S} where a^a. > 0, then
f(S',d») = (a±Zl + b x , a2 z 2 + b 2 ).
Sometimes this property goes by the alternate name "independence of
positive linear transformations of the payoffs." Since the choice
of origin and scale for each player's utility function is unrelated
to that of the other player's, this property essentially specifies
that the numerical levels of utility assigned to each outcome have
no standing in the theory, and no comparisons of the numerical utility
payoffs received by the two players can play any role in determining
the outcome of bargaining.
Nash proved the following remarkable theorem.
Theorem 1. (Nash, 1950) : There is a unique solution which
possesses properties 1-4. It is the solution f=F defined by
F(S,d) = z such that z > d and (z^O (z
2
-d
2
) > (^-d^ (x2-d2 )
for all points x in S distinct from z such that x > d.
That is, in the region of S yielding positive gains to both players,
Nash's solution F selects the unique point z which maximizes the geometric
average (i.e. the product) of the gains available to the players, as
measured against their disagreement payoffs. Furthermore, the solution
F possesses properties 1-4, and it is the only solution which does.
While the four properties which Nash considered are sufficient to
characterize the solution F, there are of course other properties of the
solution which may be useful to consider. One of the most elementary of
these is that, as we have noted, Nash's solution always yields each
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player a positive gain over his disagreement point; i.e., it possesses
the following property.
Property 5. Strong individual rationality: f(S,d) > d.
This property is elementary in the sense that it might reasonably be
expected to be descriptive of any bargaining process which results in
agreement, since neither player has any incentive to accept an agreement
which does not yield him a higher utility than he can achieve without
agreement. (Recall that the payoffs are assumed to be in terms of utility,
which completely summarize a player's preferences.)
It has recently been shown (Roth (1977a), (1978)) that if property 5
is incorporated into the characterization of a solution, then the elimina-
tion of property 1 causes no change in Nash's conclusion, while the eli-
mination of property 2 leads to a straightforward generalization of Nash's
result. Specifically, we have the following two theorems.
Theorem 2. (Roth, 1977a): Nash's solution F is the unique
solution which possesses properties 2-5.
Theorem 3. (Roth, 1978): Any solution which possesses pro-
perties 3-5 is of the form f(S,d) = z such that z > d and
(z.-d
1 )
P (z
2
-d
2 )
q
> (x.-d
1 )
P (x_-d
2 )
C1 for all points x in S
distinct from z such that x > d, where p and q are fixed
positive numbers which sum to 2.
Theorem 3 says that if we drop the requirement of symmetry, then the
resulting solution must be one which maximizes the weighted geometric
average of the gains available to the players, with weights p and q.
Thus the only role of symmetry in Nash's theorem is to set p=q=l, which
causes the solution to weight equally the gains of both players. Drop-
ping symmetry permits the solution to reflect factors such as differential
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bargaining ability between players which are outside the formal descrip-
tion of the game, but it leaves the form of the solution unchanged.
(Asymmetric Nash solutions are also considered, from somewhat different
perspectives, by Harsanyi and Selten (1972), and Kalai (1977a).)
Taken together, theorems 2 and 3 indicate that Nash's result depends
hardly at all on Pareto optimality or symmetry, but relies almost entirely
on properties 3 and 4, the two independence properties. It is therefore
towards these two properties that we will direct our attention.
As already noted, property 4, independence of equivalent utility
representations, specifies that the solution may not make use of any
information about the payoffs to the players which depends on the ori-
gin or unit of those payoffs. The other independence property, in-
dependence of irrelevant alternatives, imposes restrictions of a dif-
ferent sort. Rather than reflecting limitations on the information
contained in the payoffs, it restricts the kinds of comparisons which
the bargaining process may employ. Given a fixed disagreement point,
a bargaining process which possesses property 3 essentially proceeds
by establishing a means to make binary comparisons between pairs of
alternatives, and choosing the "best" alternative, in terms of this
comparison, from any feasible set. That is, the comparison between
any two particular alternatives is determined independently of the
feasible set in which they are contained.
Of the four properties which Nash suggested, property 3 has been
the subject of the most criticism and discussion (cf. Luce and Raiffa,
1957; Roth, 1977b). Other solutions have been proposed which possess
all of Nash's properties with the exception of property 3, and of these
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alternative solutions, the one which has received the most attention
is one of several originally proposed by Raiffa (1953). Raiffa's so-
lution G is defined as follows.
For any game (S,d), let the ideal point I(S,d) = x = (x..,x-) be
defined by x.. = maxCx. |.x
^_
d and x = (x ,x„) is contained in Si, x„ =
max{x„|x
^_
d and x is contained in S}. Then x and x„ represent the max-
imal payoffs available to players 1 and 2 respectively in the indivi-
dually rational region of S. The solution G selects the maximal feasible
point on the line joining d to x; i.e., G(S,d) = z is the Pareto optimal
point such that (z..-d.. )/(z_-d
2 )
= (x.-d.. ) /(x„-d 2 ) . That is, the solu-
tion G chooses the point z which maximizes the gains of the players
subject to the restriction that the players' actual gains are in the
same proportion as their maximum potential gains. It is easy to verify
that the solution G possesses properties 1, 2, and 4, but does not
possess property 3. That is, the feasible points which determine I(S,d)
are not "irrelevant" to Raiffa's solution in the sense which they are
to Nash's solution.
Kalai and Smorodinsky (1975) have characterized G as the unique
solution which possesses properties 1, 2, 4, and an additional prop-
erty called individual monotonicity. The solution G has also been
independently proposed and studied by other investigators; e.g., Crott
(1971) anticipated the solution on the basis of an experimental study
(reviewed below) while Butrim (1976) studied the solution axiomatically.
Unlike Nash's solution which can be generalized in a straightforward
way to the case of pure bargaining games among more than two players,
it can be shown (Roth, 1979b) that the solution G does not generalize
to the case of more than two players.
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Before proceeding to a review of the experimental literature con-
cerning these models, it should be mentioned that subsequently Nash
(1953) and Raiffa (1953) also analysed certain specialized two-stage
bargaining situations, in which it is possible in the first stage for
bargainers to choose threats and make irrevocable commitments which
bind them to carry out their threats should no agreement be reached in
the second stage. The analysis of these "variable threat" situations
concentrates on the question of what threats should be chosen by the
players in the first stage, under the assumption that these threats will
determine the disagreement outcome in the second stage for a bargaining
process of the kind we have already considered, modelled by Nash's (or
Raiffa' s) solution. The conclusions reached concerning the optimal choice
of threats in such situations depend critically on the assumption that
the commitment to carry out a threat is irrevocable, as well as on the
assumption that bargaining in the second stage can be modelled by the
solutions considered earlier in this section. The pure bargaining games
we have been considering are often called "fixed-threat" games, to dis-
tinguish them from the two-stage variable threat situations by indicating
that the disagreement outcome is fixed.
Previous Experimental Research
The scope of this review will be limited to investigations which ex-
plicitly sought to test propositions based on one of the game-theoretic
models of bargaining we have been considering. It will not attempt to
include results of experiments which were conducted without any reference
to game-theoretic models, but which nevertheless might have some relevance
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to them. Most of the experiments considered here have not previously
been considered in reviews either of the more general literature on bar-
gaining (e.g., Chertkoff and Esser, 1976; Morley and Stephenson, 1977;
Rubin and Brown, 1975) or of game-theoretic models in general (e.g.,
Murnighan, 1978).
Although a number of the experiments testing game-theoretic models
of bargaining have been concerned not only with the original "fixed
threat" pure bargaining games but also with the variable-threat games,
we will concentrate on the former models only, for two reasons. First,
the fixed-threat models are more basic than the variable-threat models,
since the latter models depend in a critical way on the validity of the
former. Second, most of the experiments devoted to testing the vari-
able-threat models do not implement any procedures to make threats
irrevocable in the required way, and so these experiments tend not to
be closely related to the theoretical models they are designed to test.
Since any bargaining situation having a disagreement outcome which
each bargainer can enforce can be described as a pure bargaining game,
the conditions of the formal models leave room for a wide variety of
experimental implementations. However, since the bargaining theories
under consideration are designed to model cooperative bargaining behav-
ior, it seems reasonable to expect that they would be most descriptive
of the result of bargaining conducted under conditions which permit at
least limited communication. Indeed, with few exceptions, the experi-
ments designed to test these theories have been conducted under what
Chertkoff and Esser (1976) call conditions of explicit bargaining, in
that they permit communication, compromise, and the exchange of pro-
visional offers and counter-offers.
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With some exceptions which will be noted, the experiments considered
in this section involved bargaining over monetary payoffs, sometimes
through the intermediary step of bargaining over "points" or "chips" with
monetary value. These experiments will be organized here according to
the information which was made available to the bargainers : full in-
formation to both bargainers about the payoffs to both bargainers, or
full information to each bargainer about his own payoffs and partial
information about the other bargainer's payoffs. Most but not
all of the experiments to be considered can be classified into one
of these categories and the exceptions will be noted.
Full Information
A straightforward experiment was conducted by Nydegger and Owen
(1975), who proposed to test each of Nash's properties by observing the
results of a series of simple bargaining situations. A secondary pur-
pose of their experiment was to compare the predictive value of Nash's
solution with Raiffa's solution. In their experiment, 30 pairs of under-
graduates each participated in a single bargaining encounter involving
the distribution of monetary payoffs, about which they were fully in-
formed. Nydegger and Owen interpreted the monetary payoffs in these
games as being identical to the utility received by the bargainers. In
each of the three conditions of the experiment, a different game was
played, chosen to test Nash's properties. The bargaining was con-
ducted verbally and face-to-face, with the bargainers seated together
at a table.
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Nydegger and Owen interpret their results as supporting the propo-
sition that bargaining behavior is symmetric, Pareto optimal and inde-
pendent of irrelevant alternatives, while contradicting the proposition
that it is independent of equivalent utility representations. Specifi-
cally, in each of their games, the bargainers reached agreements which
gave them equal monetary payoffs. This supports the conclusion that,
in bargaining for money with full information about payoffs, the scale
of the monetary payoffs available has an effect on the agreements
reached, and that comparison of the monetary payoffs received by each
player plays a role in determining the outcome. A remarkable feature
of these results is the fact that, within each condition, the identical
agreement was reached by each pair of bargainers. Even if this is pri-
marily due to the social forces acting on undergraduate subjects when
placed in an artificial situation to bargain face-to-face for negligible
amounts of money, it at least indicates that the information available
to the bargainers was sufficient to enable them to identify a particular
salient outcome.
Another experiment designed to test Nash's properties was conducted
by Rapoport, Frenkel, and Perner (1977). Like the previous experiment,
it was conducted for monetary payoffs about which the bargainers were
given full information, and over which they bargained face-to-face. This
experiment was designed to test three of Nash's four properties: symmetry,
Pareto optimality and independence of equivalent utility representations.
Participants were randomly paired, and bargained in 24 games against
the same opponent, in games chosen to test the three properties. In-
dependence of irrelevant alternatives was not tested. One goal of
-16-
this experiment was to consider differences between the variable-threat
bargaining situation and the classical fixed-threat situation, but we
will be concerned here only with the condition concerning the classical
bargaining situation, with a fixed disagreement outcome.
Bargaining was conducted with the bargainers seated face-to-face
on either side of a partition which allowed them to see one another and
talk freely, but which also allowed them to write privately. Following
a period of unstructured verbal bargaining, each bargainer separately
wrote down his demand. There were two iterations of this procedure,
after which, if the demands were compatible, each player received the
weighted average he had demanded. Otherwise each player received
his disagreement payoff.
The principle conclusion drawn by the authors is that the bargain-
ing process does not obey the property of independence of equivalent
utility representations. The authors write (p. 89) ". . .invariance
of the solution with respect to positive linear transformations on
the payoffs is grossly violated." As in the previous study, they ac-
count for this by observing that, to a large extent, the bargainers make
interpersonal comparisons of the payoffs.
Another conclusion drawn from this study is that the bargaining
process shows "significant departures from Pareto optimality." The dif-
ference between this and the previous study in this respect may be pri-
marily due to the different procedure by which agreements were reached.
Although both studies permitted unrestricted verbal bargaining, the
actual final demands in this study were made independently. This seems
to have resulted in an increase both in the number of disagreements and
-17-
in the amount of hedging of demands to insure compatibility, both of
which contribute to departures from Pareto optimality.
Some departures from symmetry were observed as well, although these
did not reach significance. As an ordinal measure, it was found that
Nash's solution was a good predictor of which player would come out
ahead in a given game, even though the agreements reached could be quite
far from those predicted by Nash's solution.
The results of this study are consistent with others conducted by
its senior author and his colleagues, reported in Rapoport and Perner
(1974) and Rapoport, Guyer, and Gordon (1976). Those studies differed
from the one just considered in that they did not attempt to test Nash's
properties separately, nor did they employ actual monetary rewards.
Also, the rules under which bargaining was conducted were somewhat more
restrictive than in the study just considered. However, players in
both studies were given full information about the payoffs. The prin-
ciple conclusion of these studies is that the outcome of bargaining
is heavily influenced by various "salient" outcomes involving inter-
personal comparisons, and that, while Nash's solution is useful as
a predictor of which player gets the larger payoff, there is a strong
tendency for agreements to be closer to an equal division than would
be predicted by Nash's solution.
Both the procedures used and the conclusions reached in the studies
by Rapoport and his colleagues are similar to those in the study con-
ducted by O'Neill (1976), who also investigated both fixed and variable
threat bargaining, without, however, attempting to test Nash's prop-
erties separately. In O'Neill's study, participants played 11 games
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against the same opponent, all involving the division of a fixed sum of
money, with full information. In each game a three-minute period of
face-to-face negotiation was allowed, after which the players separately
wrote down their bids. Comparison of the bids for compatibility followed,
with the players each receiving their share of the sum to be divided if
agreement had been reached, and otherwise receiving their disagreement
payoff. O'Neill concluded that the Nash solution is highly correlated
with the outcome of these games, so that it serves as a good predictor
of the relative advantage which a player enjoys in one game as opposed
to another. However, as in the previous studies, he also noticed (p. 100)
"a systematic shift for all games toward the equal-split outcome."
Other studies have observed the same kind of shift in bargaining
over monetary payoffs with full information. For instance, in a famous
series of experiments in which the amount of information available to
the players was an experimental variable, Siegal and Fouraker (1960;
see also Fouraker and Siegal, 1963) found that agreements in a bilateral
monopoly (one buyer, one seller) tended towards equal profit, with agree-
ments approaching equality most closely under the conditions of fullest
information about payoffs. Their studies (which were concerned only
incidentally with Nash's solution), involved bargainers trying to reach
price and quantity agreements on the sale of some commodity, communi-
cating via written numerical bids under conditions of full information,
partial information, or asymmetric information (one player informed,
one uninformed) about the monetary payoffs which each player would re-
ceive from any agreement. A similar conclusion about the effect of
varying the amount of available information was reached by Crott
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and Montmann (1973), and by Felsenthal (1977), who studied a bargaining
situation in which there was a discrete (rather than a convex) set
of feasible monetary payoffs. Messe (1971) also considered bargaining
with full information over a discrete set of feasible monetary payoffs,
and in the symmetric condition of his experiment found a strong tendency
towards equal payoffs. Komorita and Kravitz (1979) reached a some-
what similar conclusion, in a study whose experimental variables were
differences in disagreement payoffs, magnitude of the prize, and group
size. They studied pure bargaining (each bargainer could enforce the
disagreement outcome) involving groups of 2, 3, or 4 bargainers nego-
tiating over the distribution of a fixed number of "points."
Two more studies involving bargaining games with full information
about payoffs are not directly comparable to those of the other studies
considered here because they were conducted in such a way as to permit
no communication of any sort between players. Both Stone (1958) and
Crott (1971) presented participants with a set of games whose feasible
set was portrayed graphically. Each participant was instructed to
independently mark his demand on the graph, with the understanding
that the graphs marked by the player and his opponent would subse-
quently be compared to see if their demands were compatible, which
would determine whether or not agreement had been reached. In Stone's
experiment, participants were told to make their demands on a series
of games, and were told that their opponent had already made his de-
mands. In fact the opponent was imaginary. The games were defined
in terms of monetary payoffs, but the monetary awards were imaginary,
although participants were told that those whose imaginary winnings
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fell in the top 25% would receive a prize of one dollar. Stone
was primarily interested in the degree to which players hedged their
demands, and he reported a correlation between "cautious" behavior in
one game and in another, across a variety of games. In Crott 's experi-
ment, the games were also defined in terms of the feasible set of mone-
tary payoffs. After each participant had indicated his demands in a
series of games, a random pairing of bargainers in a subset of these
games determined the actual cash payoffs. Crott found that the ratio
of each player's maximum feasible payoffs was a good predictor of the
ratio of their demands. (For games whose disagreement point is the
origin, the solution G predicts payoffs in the same ratio.) A re-
lated investigation by the same author into different aspects of
bargaining is reported in Crott (1972a).
Taken together, the results of the bargaining experiments in
which the bargainers had full information about one another's mone-
tary payoffs are consistent with the proposition that comparison of
players' payoffs plays a part in determining the outcome of bargain-
ing. In view of the fact that the game-theoretic models under con-
sideration are stated in terms of utility rather than monetary pay-
offs, the question arises whether the experimentally observed com-
parisons involve money only, or whether they involve comparisons of
the players' utility in some deeper way.
Partial Information
Two experiments have been reported which attempt to address this
issue by studying bargaining situations in which the bargainers negotiate
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over the distribution of chips while having only partial information
about the value of those chips, in that each bargainer knows the value
of the chips to himself but not to his opponent. In situations of
this sort, bargainers cannot directly compare the value of their pay-
offs, since this information is not common knowledge. The two studies
which have been conducted using this procedure, by Nydegger (1977)
and Heckathorn (1978), illustrate the difficulty of implementing a
study of this kind in such a way that it conforms to the assumptions
of the models it is intended to test.
Nydegger's study, which is also reported in Nydegger (1978),
was modelled on the study by Nydegger and Owen (1975) and was inten-
ded both to test Nash's four properties and to compare the predic-
tive value of Nash's and Raiffa's solutions in bargaining with partial
information about the payoffs. In order to establish the payoff
scales, each individual was asked to select 10 items he would like
to have from a list of 20 items from the campus store, and to rank
them in order of preference. He was then told to assign the most
preferred item a value of "100 units", and to assign lower values
to the other items, "with the only constraint being to preserve the
ordinality of the rankings." Participants were then brought together
to bargain for chips which were assigned values in "units," with
the understanding that a player who earned a certain number of units
in bargaining would then receive the most preferred item which he
had assigned not more than that number of units.
The difficulty in interpreting the results of this experiment
arises from the fact that the actual payoffs available to the parti-
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cipants consisted of a discrete set of prizes. Thus, for instance,
if one of the bargainers had valued one of his potential prizes at
55 units and the next most desirable prize at 40 units, then he would
presumably be indifferent between receiving anywhere from 40 to 54
units, since any agreement in this range would yield him the same
prize. Thus if the players are assumed to be motivated by the prizes,
the "units" cannot be taken to represent the utilities of the players.
Heckathorn's (1978) study was also intended to study bargaining
under conditions of partial information, and to compare Nash's solu-
tion with Raiffa's. However, the rules under which the bargaining
was conducted did not correspond to those of a pure bargaining game,
since there was no disagreement outcome which could be enforced by
both players. A further difficulty encountered in this paper is that
Raiffa's solution is identified by an incorrect formula, which is not
independent of changes in the origins of the players' payoff scales.
Partial information of a different sort was considered in an
experiment by Hoggatt, Selten, Crockett, Gill, and Moore (1975), moti-
vated by a theoretical model based on Nash's solution, proposed by
Harsanyi and Selten (1972). In the game played in this experiment,
participants bargained over the distribution of 20 "money units" whose
value (10 cents) was known to both of them. In the event of disagree-
ment, each player received units. What each player did not know
was whether his opponent had a "high cost" of 9 units or a "low cost"
of units which would be subtracted from his winnings following any
agreement. Before the game commenced, each players' cost was determined
by a random process which gave him a 50% chance of having high or low
-23-
cost. Each player was informed only of the result of his own random
process, so that when the bargaining commenced, each player knew
his own cost and the probability distribution which determined his
opponent's cost. (Situations of this type are called games of in-
complete information.) After equating the utility of the players
with their monetary payoffs, it was found that there was substan-
tial qualitative agreement between aspects of the experimental results
and predictions of the theory, although agreements at an equal di-
vision of the 20 units were the most common, even in the case where
a player with low cost bargained against a player with high cost.
Modification of the Classical Models
The experimental evidence considered in the previous section re-
veals some considerable discrepancies between observed experimental
results and the predictions of the game-theoretic models. In particular,
the property of independence of equivalent utility representations was
consistently violated in studies in which each player knew the monetary
value of his opponent's payoffs.
There is thus ample support for the proposition that comparison of
the monetary payoffs available to the bargainers plays a role in deter-
mining the outcome of bargaining in situations which make available to
both bargainers the information necessary to make such comparisons. In
order to design a descriptive theory of bargaining for situations in
which the participants know each other's monetary payoffs (rather than
their utility payoffs), it is therefore necessary to reexamine those
aspects of the classical models which deal with the nature of the pay-
offs and the information which they convey. In this section, we will
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consider a new model which allows for the comparison of the payoffs
between players.
When bargaining games (S,d) defined in terms of the feasible
utility payoffs were considered, it was natural to impose the re-
striction that the set S be convex. However, when the game (S,d) is
defined in terms of monetary payoffs this restriction is no longer
natural, and so this section will be concerned with games from a
larger class than the class B considered so far. Let B* denote the
class of games (S,d) where S is a compact (but not necessarily convex)
subset of the plane containing the point d and at least one point x
such that x > d. For simplicity we will also require that the Pareto
optimal subset of S be connected, as would be the case in any game in
which the bargaining concerns the distribution of a divisible commodity.
(When a game (S,d) is considered as a member of the class B*, the set S
is to be interpreted as the set of feasible monetary payoffs, and the
point d as the monetary payoffs resulting from disagreement.)
A model of bargaining in such games will be a solution f de-
fined on the class B*. To be consistent with the available experi-
mental evidence, this solution should possess properties 1-3, but
not property 4. Specifically, it should incorporate information of
a kind which is precluded by property 4, about the relative payoffs
which the players receive at any agreement. It will be instructive
to consider the effect of replacing property 4 with the following
property, which in certain respects can be considered almost the
g
opposite of property 4.
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Property 4
'
: Independence of ordinal transformations preserving
interpersonal comparisons: Let (S,d) and (S',d') be games in B* such
that d'
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This property states that if a game (S',d') is derived from (S,d)
via a transformation t (of feasible payoff vectors) which (i) preserves
each player's ordinal preferences and (ii) preserves information
about which player makes larger gains at any given payoff, then the
same transformation applied to the final agreement of the game (S,d)
should yield the final agreement of the game (S',d'). That is, it
states that the solution should depend only on the ordinal preferences
of the players, and on the ordinal comparision of the payoffs to
the players at any given agreement, and not on any other features
of the payoffs. A solution which possesses property 4' thus differs
from a solution which possesses property 4 in two ways: (i) it treats
the feasible payoffs to a player as ordinal rather than interval
data (i.e. it reflects the direction of each player's preferences,
but not "how much" he prefers one payoff to another) ; and (ii) it
permits ordinal comparisons of one player's payoffs to those of the
other player, rather than precluding all such comparisons.
One solution which possesses property 4' is the solution f=E
which selects the outcome E(S,d) = z, where z is the Pareto optimal
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point in S such that min{z-.-d.. ,z„-d„} > mintx-.-cL ,x„-d„} for all
Pareto optimal points x in S distinct from z. The solution E picks
the Pareto optimal point in S which maximizes the minimum gains avail-
able to the players. The letter E was chosen to reflect the fact that
this solution selects the outcome which gives both players equal
gains, whenever there exists a Pareto optimal outcome with this prop-
erty. In any event, the solution E always selects the Pareto optimal
point which comes closest to giving the players equal gains.
Just as Nash's solution is uniquely characterized by properties
1, 2, 3, and 4, it turns out that the equal gains solution E can be
characterized by properties 1,2,3, and 4'. That is, we can state the
following new result.
Theorem 4 : The equal gains solution E is the unique
individually rational solution which possesses proper-
ties 1,2,3, and 4'
.
The proof of this theorem is given in the appendix.
The equal gains solution E can thus be thought of as differing from
Nash's solution only in the kind of information which is assumed to de-
termine the outcome of bargaining. Property 4 permits Nash's solution
to be sensitive to the intensity of each players' preferences for the
various potential outcomes (as measured by von Neumann-Morgenstern util-
ity functions), but requires it to be insensitive to any comparison be-
tween players. Property 4', on the other hand, permits the equal gains
solution E to be sensitive to comparisons of the payoffs the bargainers
get at any given outcome, and to be sensitive to each players' ordinal
preferences over different outcomes, but prevents it from being sensi-
tive to the intensity of their preferences over different outcomes.
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The experiment described in the following section is designed to
help distinguish the effects of those two kinds of information.
A New Experiment
The experiment reported here is designed to test the hypothesis that
the information which influences the outcome of bargaining is to a large
extent the information which is shared by both bargainers, as opposed to
information available to only one of the bargainers. We will examine
the hypothesis that Nash's solution is descriptive of bargaining situa-
tions in which each player does know his opponent's von Neumann-
Morgenstern utility for each outcome but does not know his opponent's
monetary payoff. We will also examine the related hypothesis that,
when the players know both their opponents' monetary payoffs as well
as their utilities, the outcome of bargaining will be influenced by
interpersonal comparisons, in the direction of equal gains. Simply
put, we will be examining the hypothesis that Nash's solution is des-
criptive of bargaining when the players share the sort of information
assumed by property 4, and that property 4 (and consequently Nash's
solution) fails to be descriptive when the shared information is of a
different sort. (The specific implications of these hypotheses for
our experiment will be described in detail following the description
of the experimental design.)
None of the experiments reviewed earlier necessarily permit the
players to know one another's von Neumann-Morgenstern expected utility
for an agreement, since even the experiments conducted under conditions
of full information revealed only the monetary payoffs available. To
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the extent that a player has a utility function which is not linear in
money, this utility function is not known to the player's opponent (nor
to the experimenter) . At the same time, in giving each player informa-
tion about his opponent's monetary payoffs, these experiments gave the
players information about their opponent's payoffs which is not contained
in the players' utility functions, and which is defined on a common ab-
solute scale, rather than on independently normalized interval scales.
The fact that observed agreements tended towards equal payoffs makes
clear that this information played a role in the bargaining, since the
comparisons necessary to determine equality are not well-defined on
independently normalized interval scales.
Thus the experiments reviewed above provided less information of
one kind (about the utilities) and more information of another kind
(about the monetary awards) than is assumed to be relevant by the
9
classical game- theoretic models being tested. The experiment des-
cribed below is designed to provide participants with the required in-
formation about their opponent's utility for the available payoffs,
and to permit information about the underlying monetary payoffs to be
provided or withheld as an experimental variable.
Design of the Experiment
Recall that knowing an individual's expected utility for a given
agreement is exactly equivalent to knowing what lottery he thinks is as
desirable as that agreement. Thus in a bargaining game whose feasible
agreements are the appropriate kind of lotteries, knowing the utilities
of the players at a given agreement is equivalent to simply knowing
the lottery they have agreed on.
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In each game of this experiment, therefore, players bargained
over the probability that they would receive a certain monetary prize,
possibly a different prize for each player. Specifically, in each
of four games played under two information conditions, players bar-
gained over how to distribute "lottery tickets" which would determine
the probability that each player would win his personal lottery (i.e.
a player who received 45% of the lottery tickets would have a 45%
chance of winning his specified monetary award, and a 55% chance of
winning nothing). In the event that no agreement was reached, each
player received nothing. In the full information condition, each play-
er was informed of the value of his own potential prize and of his
opponent's potential prize; in the partial information condition,
each player was informed only of the value of his own prize.
Each player played four games, in random order, under one of the
information conditions, against different opponents. Players were
allowed to communicate freely by teletype, but they were unaware
of the identity of their opponents. In game 1, no restriction was
placed on the percentage of lottery tickets which each player could
receive, and both players had the same potential payoff of $1.00.
Game 2 was played with the same potential payoffs as game 1, but one
of the players (player 2) was restricted to receive no more than
60% of the lottery tickets. Game 3 was played with the same rules
as game 1, but with different monetary payoffs for the two players:
$1.25 for player 1, and $3.75 for player 2. Game 4 was played under
the same rules as game 2, with the same prizes as game 3 (see Figure 1)
.
Figure 1 about here
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In order to interpret the set of feasible outcomes in each of
these games in terms of each player's utility function for money,
recall that if we consider each player's utility function to be nor-
malized so that his utility for receiving his own prize is 1, and his
utility for not receiving it is zero, then his utility for any lot-
tery between those two alternatives is the probability of winning
the lottery.
Note that we are considering the feasible set of utility payoffs
to be defined in terms of the utility function of each player for the
lottery which he receives, independently of the bargaining which has
taken place to achieve this lottery, and even independently of the
lottery which his opponent receives. In doing so, we are taking the
point of view that, while the progress of the negotiations may in-
fluence the utilities of the bargainers for the agreement eventually
reached, the description of any effect which this has on the agree-
ment reached belongs in the model of the bargaining process, rather
than in the model of the bargaining situation. Considerable confusion
in the literature has resulted from attempts to interpret bargain-
ing models in terms of the players' utilities for outcomes after
the bargaining has ended, since no bargaining model can be falsified
by experimental evidence if, after an outcome has been chosen, the
utilities of the players can be interpreted as having changed in
whatever way is necessary to be consistent with the model. In order
to have predictive value, bargaining theories must be stated in terms
of parameters which can be measured independently of the phenomena
which the theories are designed to predict, and it is for this reason
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that we consider the utilities which define the game, in either informa-
tion condition, to be simply each player's utility for money (cf. the
passage from Chertkoff and Esser (1976) quoted at the beginning of this
,
10
paper)
.
The Predictions of the Models
Since the monetary awards available to the players in each game
are the same under both information conditions, so are the feasible
utility payoffs. Since the classical game theoretic models depend only
on the feasible set of utility payoffs (i.e., since they are defined
on the class B of games), both Nash's solution and Raiffa's predict
no difference between the two information conditions.
Property 1, Pareto optimality, predicts that, in all four games,
agreements will be reached, and the agreements will divide all of the
lottery tickets. Property 2, symmetry, predicts that, in game 1, the
players will receive equal percentages of the lottery tickets. (Thus
properties 1 and 2 together imply a 50-50 split in game 1.) Property
3, independence of irrelevant alternatives, then predicts that game 2
will reach the same outcome as game 1 (since the restriction in game 2
does not exclude the 50-50 split). Property 4, independence of equiva-
lent utility representations, predicts that game 3 will have the same
outcome as game 1, and game 4 will have the same outcome as game 2,
since these games differ only in the size of the monetary prizes, which
affects only the scale of the utility functions.
Taken together, Properties 1-4 thus predict a 50-50 split in all
four games. Since Nash's solution F possesses all four properties, this
is the prediction of Nash's solution. In what follows, it will sometimes
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be convenient to discuss the predictions of the models in terms of the
quantity I) defined as the percentage of lottery tickets received by
player 2 minus the percentage of lottery tickets received by player 1.
The prediction of Nash's solution is that D^ will equal for all four
games, under both information conditions.
Raiffa's solution G does not possess property 3, and so it pre-
dicts a different outcome for game 2 than for game 1; like Nash's solu-
tion, it predicts that game 1 will result in a 50-50 split, but in
game 2 it predicts that players 1 and 2 will receive 62.5% and 37.5%
of the lottery tickets, respectively. Since it possesses property 4,
it predicts that game 3 should have the same outcome as game 1, and
game 4 should have the same outcome as game 2. Thus Raiffa's solution
predicts that B_ will equal for games 1 and 3, and that it will equal
-25 for games 2 and 4, under both information conditions.
Our principal experimental hypothesis is that only in the partial
information condition will the observed outcomes be consistent with
property 4, since property 4 specifies that only the utility functions
of the players should be relevant to the outcome, and this is precisely
the information shared by the players in the partial information condi-
tion. Thus games 1 and 3 should yield the same outcome in this condi-
tion, as should games 2 and 4. It would be consistent with the results
of most of the studies reviewed earlier if the observations were con-
sistent with properties 1-3 as well, and so our hypothesis for this
condition is that Nash's solution will be descriptive.
In the full information condition, the principal hypothesis is
that the observations will continue to be consistent with properties 1-3,
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but will no longer be consistent with property 4: i.e., game 1 will
yield a different outcome than game 3, and game 2 will yield a differ-
ent outcome than game 4. In this condition, the players share both
the information about one another's utility specified by property 4,
as well as the information about each other's monetary payoffs needed
to make the kind of comparisons specified by property 4'. Since
property 4 yields Nash's solution F when combined with properties 1-3,
while property 4' yields the equal gains solution E, our hypothesis
is that, in this condition, the observations will tend to fall between
those predicted by the two solutions. (Note that the results of the
earlier studies conducted under conditions of full information also
tended to fall between the predictions of these two solutions.) The
equal gains solution, defined on the expected monetary payoffs (rather
than the expected utility payoffs)
,
predicts that the players will
each receive 50% of the lottery tickets in games 1 and 2, and that in
games 3 and 4 players 1 and 2 will receive 75% and 25%, respectively.
(This would result in an expected monetary payoff of 50 cents to each
player in games 1 and 2, and 94 cents to each player in games 3 and 4.)
The experimental hypotheses are therefore that, in the full infor-
mation condition, D will equal for games 1 and 2, and be between
and -50 for games 3 and 4. In the partial information condition, D
should equal for all four games.
Methods
Each participant was seated at a visually isolated terminal of a
computer-assisted instruction system developed at the University of
Illinois, called PLATO, whose features include advanced graphic displays
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and interactive capability. The experiment was conducted in a room
containing over 70 terminals, most of which were occupied at any given
time by students uninvolved in this experiment. No more than 9 of
the terminals were used for the experiment at any time (eight terminals
occupied by participants, and one terminal used by the experimenter to
monitor the proceedings) . Participants were seated by the experimenter
in order of their arrival at scattered terminals throughout the room,
and for the remainder of the experiment they received all of their
instructions, and conducted all communication, through the terminal.
The subject pool was from an introductory business administration
course mostly taken by college sophomores. No special skill or exper-
ience was required for participation. Pretests were run with the same
subject pool to make sure that the instructions to participants were
clear and easily understandable.
Background information such as a brief review of probability theory
was first presented. The main tools of the bargaining were then intro-
duced: these consisted of sending messages or sending proposals. A
proposal was a pair of numbers, the first of which was the sender's
probability of receiving his/her prize and the second was the receiver's
probability. The use of the computer enabled any asymmetry in the
presentation to be avoided. PLATO also computed the expected value of
each proposal and displayed the proposal on a graph of the feasible
region. After being made aware of these computations, the bargainer
was given the option of cancelling the proposal before its transmittal.
Proposals were said to be binding on the sender, and an agreement was
reached whenever one of the bargainers returned a proposal identical to
the one he had just received.
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Messages were not binding. Instead, they were used to transmit
any thoughts which the bargainers wanted to convey to each other.
To insure anonymity, the monitor intercepted any messages that re-
vealed the identity of the players. In the partial information con-
dition the monitor also intercepted messages containing information
about the available prizes. The intercepted message was returned
to the sender with a heading indicating the reason for such action.
To verify their understanding of the basic notions, the sub-
jects were given some drills followed by a simulated bargaining ses-
sion with the computer. As soon as all the participants finished this
portion of the experiments, they were paired at random and the bar-
gaining started.
At the end of 12 minutes or when agreement was reached (which-
ever came first), the subjects were informed of the results of that
game and were asked to wait until all the other bargainers were fi-
nished. For the subsequent game there were new random pairings, and
the bargaining resumed. The cycle continued until all four games were
completed. At no point in the experiment were the players aware of
what the other participants were doing, or of the identity of their
opponents.
The bargaining process consisted of the exchange of messages
and proposals, and participants were instructed that "your objective
should be to maximize your own earnings by taking advantage of the
special features of each session." Only if the bargainers reached
agreement on what percentage of the "lottery tickets" each would re-
ceive were they allowed the opportunity to participate in the lot-
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tery for the particular game being played. All transactions were
automatically recorded.
The lotteries were held after all four games were completed, and
each player was informed of the outcomes and the amount of his win-
nings. A brief explanation of the purpose of the experiment was then
given, and the subjects were offered the opportunity to type any com-
ments, questions etc., and were directed to the monitor who paid
them.
Results
The 76 games played yielded 72 agreements (95%) of which 71 (99%)
were Pareto optimal, so that 93% of the bargaining encounters ended in
a Pareto optimal agreement.
Because the players did not know who they were bargaining with and
since a different random pairing of the subjects was performed in each
session, we shall assume the replication effect due to games to be
negligible. This assumption of independence is consistent with the
assumptions made by Kahane and Rapoport (1974)
.
Table 1 gives the means and standard deviations for D_. (An out-
lier in game 3 of the full information condition has been removed.) The
Insert Table 1 about here
zero variance for game 1 precludes conventional analysis. However,
games 2, 3, and 4 in the partial information condition were not sig-
nificantly different from zero, with _t(7) = 0.45, _t(7) = 1.528, and
t_(7) = 1.722, respectively. In the full information condition also,
game 2 was not significantly different from zero: t(10) = 0.520.
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Both games 3 and 4 were then compared across information condi-
tions. A t-test was performed yielding a significant difference
t_(10.28) 1:L = 5.88, p < 0.001 for game 3 and _t(10.91) = 2.76, p < 0.02
for game 4. (The Mann-Whitney U test substantiated this finding.)
T-tests were then performed to compare game 1 with game 3, and
game 2 with game 4. In the partial information condition, game 1 was
not significantly different from game 3, with _t(14) = -1.53 and game 2
was not significantly different from game 4, with t_(14) = -1.16. In
the full information condition, however, game 1 was significantly dif-
ferent from game 3 with _t(19) = 5.97, p < 0.001, and game 2 was sig-
nificantly different from game 4 with t_(20) = -2.56, p < 0.02.
We then compared game 1 to game 2 finding no significant differ-
ence in both the full and the partial information conditions with
_t(20) = .52, and t_(14) = -.45, respectively. Comparison of games 3
and 4 did not yield a significant difference in the full information
condition with t_(19) = 1.41 whereas, in the partial information condi-
tion, there was a significant difference with t_(14) = -2.29, p < 0.04.
Thus the results are consistent with the hypothesis that games 3
and 4 in the full information condition are different from all the
other games. Inspection of the data in Table 1 also clearly affirms
the presence of the predicted effect. (The unaggregated data are given
in Table 2.)
Insert Table 2 about here
The high percentage of Pareto optimal agreements lends support
to the proposition that the bargaining process observed here can be
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described by Nash's property 1, under both information conditions.
Nash's property 3, independence of irrelevant alternatives, is descrip-
tive in the full information condition but is not supported in the case
of games 3 and 4 of the partial information condition. Under the par-
tial information condition, the similarity of the means for all four
games, and the fact that they are not significantly different from zero,
support the proposition that the bargaining process under this condi-
tion possesses properties 2 and 4. In the full information condition,
the differences between the data for games 1 and 3, and the differences
between the data for 2 and 4, suggest that comparison of the expected
monetary payoffs to each player played a role in determining the agree-
ments reached. Informal examination of the transcripts containing the
messages exchanged by the players also support this conclusion. Of the
22 outcomes observed In games 3 and 4 under full information, 19 re-
sulted in agreements and 17 (87%) of these lie between the predictions
of Nash's solution and the equal gains solution. The principal hypoth-
eses which the experiment was designed to test are thus supported by
the results.
Summary and Conclusions
The principle issue with which this paper has been concerned is
the effect which the quality of the information commonly shared by
the bargainers has on the outcome of bargaining. We saw that Nash's
model of the bargaining process depends primarily on only two of the
properties which he proposed, one of which is intimately connected
with the assumption that the utility function of a bargainer constitutes
the only information available to his opponent about his payoff at any
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agreement. A review of the experimental literature showed that, when
the utility of the players is taken to be identical to their monetary
payoffs, this property is violated.
A new experiment was designed to investigate whether this di-
vergence between the theoretical predictions and the results observed
in previous experiments might be due to the fact that the information
made available in those experiments differed from the assumptions of
of Nash's model. By having players bargain over lotteries, it was
possible to produce experimental conditions in which the players know
one another's utilities. In the partial information condition, this
was the only information which each player had about his opponent's
payoffs, and so the information shared by the bargainers conformed to
the assumptions of Nash's model. The experimental results supported
the hypothesis that Nash's solution is descriptive of the bargaining
process under this condition. In the full information condition, in
which the players knew each others monetary awards as well as their
utilities, the results confirmed the hypothesis that, in games where
the monetary awards to the players differed, the agreements reached
would show a shift in the direction of equal monetary gains.
The full information condition made possible comparison of the
expected monetary payoffs each player would receive from any agreement,
and the results strongly support the hypothesis that these comparisons
played a role in the bargaining process. It was shown that if Nash's
property 4 were replaced with a property (4') which permitted such com-
parisons, then a solution could be derived which predicted agreements
in which the players received equal gains. (This could be viewed as
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a formal derivation of some of the "equity"-related predictions which
have been made in bargaining contexts). Both Nash's property 4 and
property 4' are rather extreme, in that 4 permits only the intensity
of players' preferences but not comparison of their payoffs to affect
the bargaining process, while property 4' allows only for the effect
of comparisons but not for the intensity of preferences. Since the
full information condition provides the necessary information both
for comparisons of payoffs and for judgements about intensity of pref-
erences, it is not too surprising that the results in this condition
largely fell between the predictions of Nash's solution and the equal
gains solution. This suggests that, in this condition, both kinds
of information influenced the bargaining.
This seems likely to be quite a general phenomenon, since even
in many conventional bargaining situations, in which the bargainers
have no direct knowledge of each others utilities, it is still prob-
able that each bargainer can form some estimate of the intensity of
his opponent's preferences over various agreements. The fact that the
results of many of the earlier experiments also fall between the pre-
dictions of Nash's solution and the equal gains solution tends to bear
this out. It may also be the case that bargaining situations in which
the bargainers share the most information will also offer the most
scope for individual bargaining ability. The variances presented in
Table 1 lend support to this hypothesis, since the dispersion of the
results is greater under the full information condition than under
the partial information condition. Further experimental work will be
needed, to explore how different kinds of information are incorporated
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into the bargaining process, and how the distribution of this informa-
tion between the bargainers influences the outcome of bargaining. More
sophisticated mathematical models will be needed which are able to deal
simultaneously with the different kinds of information available to
the bargainers, and to indicate how it may affect different aspects
of the bargaining.
Much of the research in the social psychology literature has con-
centrated on what focal points become "salient" in the course of nego-
tiations. The experimental results presented here, together with the
consequences of Properties 4 and 4 1 as reflected by Nash's solution and
the equal gains solution, make it clear that 'salience' in negotiations
is dependent on the information shared by the bargainers. Insight into
the mechanism by which outcomes become salient in bargaining may shed
light on more general questions concerning how mutual expectations are
formed in social situations.
A more general conclusion supported by this paper is that game-
theoretic models of bargaining provide a powerful theoretical frame-
work, with testable empirical content, and with sufficient flexi-
bility to permit the study of a wide range of bargaining situations.
The practice of deriving a solution from its characteristic properties
permits the design of experiments which test those properties, and the
results of such experiments suggest new properties which, because
of the deductive nature of formal mathematical models, permit the
derivation of new solutions. There thus appear to be good prospects
for considerable interaction between further development of theory
and continued experimental investigation in this area.
M/C/114
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Footnotes
1. A more complete and technical account of this subject is to be
found in a forthcoming monograph (Roth; 1979b)
.
2. Although there is experimental evidence (e.g. Tversky, 1969)
that individuals* preferences may not always obey the conditions
necessary for them to be modelled by a utility function, these
conditions still retain normative significance. Furthermore, the
violations of these conditions have generally been observed in
multi-attribute decision situations, rather than in decisions
involving a single commodity (e.g. money), of the sort involved
in the experiments to be considered here.
3. This is a standard assumption in game theory, referred to as the
assumption of "complete information."
4. A convex set of vectors is one which contains any weighted
average of any two elements. Since the utility of a lottery
is its expected utility (i.e. the weighted average of the utili-
ties over which the lottery is conducted), S is convex if lot-
teries are feasible.
5. The distinction between "full" and "partial" information made
here should not be confused with the technical game-theoretic
terms "complete" and "incomplete" information (cf. footnote 3),
or "perfect" and "imperfect" information.
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6. Further investigations by Crott and his co-workers into various
aspects of bargaining are reported in Crott (1972b), and in Crott
et al. (1974, 1976, 197a). These studies fall outside the scope
of this review, but they are mentioned here for completeness,
since they have not been included in the reviews of the English-
language literature.
7. Heckathorn refers to Raiffa's solution as the "Smorodinsky-Kalai"
solution.
8. An alternative approach is investigated by Kalai (1977b), Meyerson
(1977), and Roth (1979a). These and other related approaches
are considered in Roth (1979b)
.
9. That is, knowing a player's monetary payoffs does not permit his
utility function to be known, except in the special case in which
his utility is known to be linear in money. Even in this case,
however, knowing his monetary payoffs conveys additional informa-
tion, not conveyed by his utility function alone.
10. An alternative approach (particularly in the full information con-
dition) would have been to try to assess the utility of each player
for all possible divisions of the lottery tickets; i.e., to incor-
porate into the utility functions each player's preferences for his
standing relative to his opponent, as well as for the monetary pay-
off which he receives himself. In this particular experiment, this
would have no effect on the utility functions of the players for
any potential Pareto-optimal agreement, so long as each player
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prefers, of any two agreements, the one which gives him the higher
percentage of lottery tickets. (This is because each agreement is
a lottery between the same two outcomes—the most preferred and
the least preferred Pareto-optimal agreements.) However, there
could, in general, be an effect on the utility of the players for
the disagreement outcome and for the non-Pareto-optimal agreements.
However, for the reasons indicated, we will consider the set of
feasible utilities associated with each game to be defined by each
player's utility for money.
11. Due to the unequal variances in the two samples, a non-integer d.f,
is reported.
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Appendix: Proof of Theorem 4
Theorem 4: The equal gains solution E is the unique solution which
is strongly individually rational, strongly Pareto optimal, independent
of irrelevant alternatives, and independent of ordinal transformations
preserving interpersonal comparisons.
Proof ; It is straightforward to verify that the solution E is
well-defined and possesses the properties specified by the theorem.
We need to show that it is the unique solution with those properties;
i.e., that if f is a solution possessing the specified properties, then
f(S,d) = ECS,d) for any (S,d) in B*. For any game (S,d), let p"(S) de-
note the Pareto optimal subset of S, and let S, = {x e s|x >. d} be the
individually rational subset of S.
First observe that if f is individually rational, strongly Pareto
optimal, and independent of irrelevant alternatives, then for any
CS,d)£B*, f(S,d) = f(T,d) where T = P(S*)f{d}. (This follows since
individual rationality implies that f(S,d)&S, = {x£s|x>d}, strong
Pareto optimality implies f (S,d)€.P(S
,) , and so independence of irrele-
vant alternatives implies f(S,d) = f(T,d) for any subset T of S which
contains P(S ).) We will sometimes denote the game (T,d) by (P(S,),d),
which is a slight abuse of our notation, since d£P(S,). However it
will be understood that in this case the set of feasible payoff vectors
is P(S,)(/{d}. So it will be sufficient to show that f and E coincide
d
on games of the form (P(S,),d), and Property 1 further insures that it
will be sufficient to show this when d = (0,0) = 0.
Let A be the convex hull of the points (2,0); (0,2); and 0; we
will show that f(P(A),0) = E(P(A),0) = (1,1), (where P(A) is of course
the line segment joining the points (2,0) and (0,2)). To show this it
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is sufficient to note that the set P(A)L/{0} can be mapped into itself
by the transformation t = (t..,t„) given by
02x^/(1 + x
x
) for _<_ x
x
<_ x
2
t
1
(x
1
,x
2
) =
j
( x1
+ x„ - t„(x
1
,x
2
) for <_ x„ < x1
t x- + x„ - t
1
(x
1
,x„) for _< x. <_ x_
t„(x ,x„) - J
I 2x
2
/(l + x
2 )
for < x
2
< X]
_
.
This transformation t defined on the set P(A) l/{0} satisfies the condi-
tions of Property 1' and leaves only the points 0, (2,0), (1,1), and
(0,2) fixed. But since t transforms the game (P(A),0) into itself,
Property^.' requires that f(P(A),0) = t(f (P(A) ,0)) ; i.e., f(P(A),0) must
be a fixed point of t. The unique fixed point of t in P(A) which is
strongly individually rational is the point (1,1), and so f(P(A),0) =
(1,1), as required.
Next, observe that it will be sufficient for our proof to show
that f and E coincide on games (P(S_),0) such that P(S) is a subset
_ + _
of P(A). To see this, consider an arbitrary game of the form (P(S_),0),
and let (P(T),0) be a game such that P(T) contains P(S), and P(T) =
{(x. ,<t>(x_)) |0 <[ x.. <_ x
1
} where <j> is a continuous decreasing function
such that <Kx-, ) = 0. (Thus P(T) touches both axes; i.e., it contains
points of the form (0,x„) and (x.,0).) Then there is a (unique) point
x* in P(T) which gives the players equal gains; let x* = (c,c), where
c is a positive real number. The transformation t = (t..,t_) given by
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<x
1
for <_ x.. _< c
C
l l
,x
2
=
i
/ 2c - x„ otherwise
(2c - x- for <_ x < c
t
2
(x
L
,x
2
) = /
! x„ otherwise
transforms the game (P(T),0) into the game (cP(A),0). So the transfor-
mation t' = t/c transforms (P(T),0) into (P(A),0), and thus transforms
the arbitrary game (P(S-rr) ,0) into a game whose strong Pareto set is a
subset of P(A). Froperty 4' thus assures that if f and E coincide on
subsets of P(A) then they coincide everywhere.
But if P(S) is a subset of P(A) which contains the point
f(P(A),0) = (1,1), then independence of irrelevant alternatives implies
f(P(S),0) - (1,1) as well. If (1,1) is not an element of P(S) then
P(S) is contained either in a line segment joining (0,2) to x = (x.. ,x„)
such that x maximizes player l's payoff in P(S) and x.. < x„, or
else in a line segment joining (2,0) to the point x = (x. ,x„) which
maximizes player 2's payoff, and for which x_ < x.
.
But either of these line segments can be transformed into itself leaving
only its endpoints fixed, so that Property 4' together with independence
of irrelevant alternatives and strong individual rationality implies that
f(P(S),0) = x = E(P(S),0), which completes the proof.
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Max % Max %
Prize for Prize for Allowed Allowed
Player 1 Player 2 Player 1 Player 2
Game 1 $1.00 $1.00 100% 100%
Game 2 $1.00 $1.00 100% 60%
Game 3 $1.25 $3.75 100% 100%
Game 4 $1.25 $3.75 100% 60%
Figure 1
The prizes and feasible distributions
for games 1-4
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TABLE 1
Means and Standard Deviations for D,
GAMES
Full
Information 0.0 -1.909 -34.600* -21.636
(11 pairs) (0.0) (12.169) (19.277) (22.482)
Partial
Information 0.0 1.325 2.500 -2.500
(8 pairs) (0.0) (8.335) (4.629) (4.106)
* The mean and standard deviation are reported after the removal of
an outlier (D = +98 resulting from a (1,99) agreement) which is
6.8 standard deviations from the mean.
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TABLE 2
Percentage of Lottery Tickets
FULL INFORMATION
Play er
GAME// GROUP* 1 2 D
1 1 50.00 50.00 0.00
50.00 50.00 0.00
50.00 50.00 0.00
3 50.00 50.00 0.00
50.00 50.00 0.00
50.00 50.00 0.00
5 50.00 50.00 0.00
50.00 50.00 0.00
7 50.00 50.00 0.00
50.00 50.00 0.00
PARTIAL INFORMATION
Player
GROUP # 1 2 D
2 50.00 50.00 0.00
50.00 50.00 0.00
50.00 50.00 0.00
4 50.00 50.00 0.00
50.00 50.00 0.00
6 50.00 50.00 0.00
50.00 50.00 0.00
8 50.00 50.00 0.00
50.00 50.00 0.00
1 50.00 50.00 0.00
50.00 50.00 0.00
50.00 50.00 0.00
3 50.00 50.00 0.00
50.00 50.00 0.00
50.00 50.00 0.00
40.00 60.00 20.00
0.00 0.00 0.00
50.00 50.00 0.00
50.00 50.00 0.00
49.70 50.30 0.60
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68.00 32.00 -36.00
25.00 40.00 15.00
50.00 50.00 0.00
50.00 50.00 0.00
6 55.00 45.00 -10.00
50.00 50.00 0.00
8 50.00 50.00 0.00
50.00 50.00 0.00
73.00 27.00 -46.00
1.00 99.00 98.00
65.00 35.00 -30.00
0.00 0.00 0.00
70.00 30.00 -40.00
75.00 25.00 -50.00
0.00 0.00 0.00
70.00 30.00 -40.00
75.00 25.00 -50.00
70.00 30.00 -40.00
45.00 55.00 10.00
50.00 50.00 0.00
50.00 50.00 0.00
50.00 50.00 0.00
45.00 55.00 10.00
6 50.00 50.00 COO
50.00 50.00 0.00
8 50.00 50.00 0.00
75.00 25.00 -50.00
75.00 25.00 -50.00
50.00 50.00 0.00
55.00 45.00 -10.00
50.00 50.00 0.00
74.00 26.00 -48.00
50.00 50.00 0.00
50.00 50.00 0.00
54.00 46.00 -8.00
50.00 50.00 0.00
51.00 49.00 -2.00
50.00 50.00 0.00
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5 0.00 0.00 0.00
60.00 40.00 -20.00
7 80.00 20.00 -60.00
60.00 40.00 -20.00
65.00 35.00 -30.00
6 55.00 45.00 -10.00
50.00 50.00 0.00
8 50.00 50.00 0.00




